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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BEICW 
The Supreme Court; has appellate jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant 
to Section 78-2-2(3) (j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and Rules 3 
and 4 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. The Supreme Court has 
transferred appellate jurisdiction of this case to the Court of Appeals 
pursuant to Section 78-2-2 (4), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as amended, and 
Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. This Court also has 
jurisdiction under Section 78-2a-3 (2) (j), Utah Code Annotated, 1953 as 
amended, and Rule 4A of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
On May 9, 1988, Judge Richard H. Moffat of the Third District Court 
signed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of law and Judgment in this case, 
awarding judgment in favor of Plaintiff Terri C. Hardy and against 
Defendant Beneficial Life Insurance Company (hereinafter "Beneficial") on 
an accidental death insurance policy. Beneficial appeals this final order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES H^ESENTED FDR REVIEW? 
This appea^ presents the following issues: 
1. What standard is to be applied in cases of extended drug 
misuse and abuse, where the question is whether the death resulting from 
the misuse and abuse of drugs is accidental xmder an accidental death 
insurance policy? 
2. Given the fact that Mr. Hardy recognized that the natural 
and probable ccaisequence of M s course of acti on in abusing and misusing 
drugs would be his eventual death from such course of action, did the trial 
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court err in applying a standard which required Beneficial to establish 
that Mr. Hardy specifically intended or expected that the act of ingesting 
drugs on the night of September 9, 1981, would cause his death on the 
morning of September 10, 1981. 
3. If the standard which the trial court applied was the 
correct standard, did the trial court misapply the facts to that standard 
by failing to conclude that since Mr. Hardy understood and expected that 
the eventual result of his course of action in abusing and misusing drugs 
was death, then by necessary implication he must be deemed to have intended 
or expected that his consumption of drugs on the night of September 9, 
1981, would result in his death on September 10, 1981. 
4. Given the maxim that every man will be held to intend the 
natural and probable consequences of his deeds; where the stipulated facts 
demonstrate that the natural and probable consequence of Mr. Hardy's course 
of action in misusing and abusing drugs would be his death from such misuse 
and abuse, and where Mr. Hardy died from the misuse and abuse of drugs, did 
the trial court err in concluding that Mr. Hardy's death on September 10, 
1981, was unintended and unexpected and therefore accidental. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case arises out of a dispute over a claim for benefits 
under an accidental death insurance policy. 
Plaintiff's husband, Bryce W. Hardy, died on September 10, 
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1981, as a result of his misuse and abuse of narcotic drugs. Mr. Hardy's 
death was the result of an extended course of action in the misuse and 
abuse of drugs. In 1973, Mr. Hardy began losing Darvon (a trade name for 
propoxyphene) and by November 1974, he was abusing Darvon through excessive 
use. Mr. Hardy continued to misuse and abuse drugs from 1974 to the date 
of his death. During this period of time, he was repeatedly counseled and 
warned by a number of physicians and other health care professionals that 
his continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life shortening process 
and that he would end up killing himself. In 1977, while despondent over 
the failure of his first marriage, Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in a comatose 
state as the result of an attempt to commit suicide by taking an overdose 
of Valium and alcohol. In April 1981, he was again hospitalized in a 
condition of respiratory arrest as the result of an overdose of Darvon and 
Methadone. 
On the ni^ tit of September 9, 1981, Mr. Hardy consumed an 
urrietermined and undeterminable amount of codeine, propoxyphene and 
trimethobenzamide. On the morning of September 10, 1981, Mr. Hardy, at the 
age of 29, died of ^combined codeine, propoxyphene and trimethobenzamide 
intoxication". Ihe drugs found in Mr. Hardy's body after his death may 
lawfully be obtained only by prescription; there is no evidence that Mr. 
Hardy obtained such drugs by prescription. 
Mr. Hardy was a man of normal intelligence and was not 
suffering from any mental disease or defect. He understood that the 
natural, probable and expected consequence of his continued misuse and 
abuse of drugs would be to shorten his life and result in his cwn death. 
At the time of his death, Mr. Hardy's life was insured under a 
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group policy with Beneficial. The policy provided Mr. Hardy's beneficiary, 
his wife, Terri, a benefit of $25,000 if Mr. Hardy died an accidental 
death. Beneficial denied Mrs. Hardy's claim for recovery on the policy on 
the ground that Mr. Hardy's death was not accidental. 
B. The Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Court Below 
On January 27, 1988, Mrs. Hardy and Beneficial executed and 
filed a Stipulated Statement of Facts (hereinafter "Stipulated Facts") with 
the District Court and argued the case before Judge Richard H. Moffat. 
(Record at 835-843, See Addendum A-l) Both Mrs. Hardy and Beneficial 
intended this hearing to constitute a bench trial and that the court render 
a decision. Judge Moffat, apparently under the mistaken impression that 
the case was before the court on a Motion for Summary Judgment, filed a 
Minute Entry on February 9, 1988, in which he denied Beneficial's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. (Record at 826-829, See Addendum A-2) 
The parties subsequently wrote Judge Moffat clarifying that their 
intent had been to submit the case to the court for a final decision on the 
merits. On May 9, 1988, Judge Moffat entered Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and a Judgment. (Record at 831-834, See Addendum A-3) The District 
Court found the facts to be those as stipulated to by the parties and made 
the following Conclusion of Law: 
As the stipulated facts do not demonstrate 
that Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected 
that his consumption of drugs would cause his death 
on September 10, 1981, the Court concludes that Mre 
Hardy's death was the result of accidental bodily 
injury within the meaning of the insurance policy 
in question. 
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The District Court awarded judgment to Mrs. Hardy. (R. 833.) 
On June 6, 1988, Beneficial filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 1063-64.) On 
July 29, 1988, the Supreme Court transferred this case to the Court of 
Appeals. 
C. Statement of F&cts 
1. Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981, as a result of a 
narcotic intoxication resulting from ingestion of drugs which may lawfully 
be obtained only by prescription. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 1; R. 835.) 
2. The Utah State Medical Examiner's report listed the cause of 
death as a "combined codeine, propoxyphene and trimethobenzamide 
intoxication" and the Medical Examiner described the manner of death as 
"Uraietermined", as distinguished from "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and 
"Natural causes". R-850. The Amended Certificate of Death listed the 
cause of death as "combined codeine, propoxyphene & trimothobenzamide 
intoxication" occurring from the "Ingestion of drugs" and described the 
manner of death as "Undetermined if injured Accidentally or Purposely" as 
distinguished from "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and "Pending 
Investigation". R. 853. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 2; R. 835-836.) 
3. Following Mr. Hardy's death, the Plaintiff, Terri C. Hardy, and 
her friend, Julie Shepherd, gave written statements to the police 
describing the events preceding and immediately following Mr. Hardy's 
death. (R. 855-858, R. 860, R. 862) (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 3; 
R. 836.) 
9 
4. The Mt. Pleasant City Police Department prepared an Incident 
Report describing events on the morning of Mr. Hardy's death. (R. 864-44.) 
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 4; R. 836.) 
5. Plaintiff's evidence would shew that on the evening preceding 
his death, Mr. Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he made no 
statements, oral or written, reflecting any intention to take his own life* 
His activities, as observed by Terri Hardy, were routine and included 
making preparations for the next day's work at his job, reading to his 
children and watching television. Defendant has no evidence to contradict 
such evidence. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 5; R. 836.) 
6. On the night of September 9, 1981, or the morning of September 
10, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an undetermined amount of drugs containing 
codeine, propoxyphene (Darvon) and trimethobenzamide (Tigan). (Stipulated 
Facts, paragraph 6; R. 836.) 
7. Codeine is a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Propoxyphene 
is also a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Trimethobenzamide is an 
anti emetic agent. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 7; R. 836.) 
8. The quantity of drugs ingested by Mr. Hardy prior to his death 
is not able to be determined from the autopsy, toxicological analysis or 
any other existing data. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 8; R. 836-837.) 
9. There is no evidence of Bryce Hardy having obtained by 
prescription the drugs which he ingested on the occasion of his death. 
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 9; R. 837.) 
10. Defendant's evidence would show that the drugs Mr. Hardy 
ingested were self administered and were not prescribed by a physician for 
medical purposes and constituted an abuse and misuse of prescription drugs* 
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Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. The ingested drugs 
were taken despite treatment which Mr. Hardy had received for withdrawal 
from his addiction to such drugs and in contravention of the warnings and 
counseling which he had received to step taking such drugs. (Stipulated 
Facts, paragraph 10; R. 837.) 
11. At the time of his death Mr. Hardy was insured by Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group policies. One 
providing benefits of $25,000.00 in the event of death regardless of cause 
and the other providing a benefit of $25,000.00 only in case of accidental 
death. Plaintiff Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies. 
The benefits under the first policy were paid and this action relates to 
the accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Accidental Death: The Company will pay the sum for 
vrtiich application was made by the Insured upon 
receipt of due proof that the insured's death 
resulted, directly and independently of all other 
causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . . 
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 11; R. 837.) 
12. Prior to Bryce Hardy's death, he had been diagnosed as 
suffering from and had received treatment for drug dependency and abuse. 
(R. 868-1020.) (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 12; R. 837.) 
13. Mr. Hardy began using Darvon (a trade name for propoxyphene) 
by November, 1973. By November 1974, Mr. Hardy was abusing Darvon. During 
the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, Mr. Hardy was repeatedly counseled and 
warned by his physician that he was using excessive amounts of Darvon. 
(Stipulated F&cts, paragraph 13; R. 837-838.) 
14. In March 1977, Mr. Hardy attempted to commit suicide by taking 
an overdose of Valium (a centrally acting tranquilizing depressant) tablets 
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and alcohol and was transported by ambulance to a hospital in a comatose 
state. During this time period Mr. Hardy was very despondent about the 
failure of his first marriage. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 14; R. 838.) 
15. In 1979, while employed as a miner with Emery Mining Company, 
Mr* Hardy was involved in an accident which injured his back. He received 
prescriptions for drugs for treatment of his back pain. At other times, 
Mr. Hardy also received prescriptions for drugs for treatment of internal 
disorders associated with a diseased pancreas. (Stipulated Facts, 
paragraph 15; R.838.) 
16. By late 1979, Mr. Hardy was dependent on, and misusing and 
abusing narcotic drugs including codeine, Tylenol 3 (a combination of 
acetaminophen and codeine), Darvon (propoxyphene), Tylox (a trade name for 
oxycodone, a semi synthetic narcotic analgesic), Percodan (also a trade 
name for oxycodone) and Valium. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 16; R. 8380 
17. During 1980, and 1981, Mr. Hardy manipulated several doctors 
to obtain prescriptions for narcotic drugs. As a result of these 
manipulations he was able to obtain large quantities of prescription drugs 
which he abused and misused. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 17; R. 838.) 
18. In March, 1981, Don C. Lankford, a Clinical Social Worker and 
Certified Social Worker, met on three occasions with Mr. Hardy at the 
request of Dr. Robert T. Jackson, M.D., who was considering performing back 
surgery on Mr. Hardy. At the first meeting, Mr. lankford administered a 
test known as the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). In 
their second meeting Mr. lankford discussed the results of the MMPI test. 
At that time, Mr. Hardy stated that he had a history of drug abuse and that 
he was continuing to abuse and misuse drugs. He further stated that he had 
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previously attempted suicide and that if he got a chance, he would kill 
himself and that he wanted to die. Mir. Lankford told Mr. Hardy "that if he 
did not stop abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself." 
Mr. Lankford further advised Mr. Hardy to seek help at the St. Benedict's 
Hospital or at his local mental health center for his serious drug 
problems. After his meetings with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford advised Dr. 
Jackson against performing surgery on Mr. Hardy and that surgery was never 
performed. At the time Mr. Lankford met with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford was 
of the opinion that Mr. Hardy understood the counsel which he had given him 
and the consequences of his continued misuse and abuse of drugs. 
Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of Don 
Lankford, R. 1022-1025. Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such 
evidence. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 18; R. 838-839.) 
19. On three occasions in the spring of 1981, Mr. Hardy was 
hospitalized for treatment of prescription drug dependency. (Stipulated 
Facts, paragraph 19; R. 839.) 
20. Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in Mountain View Hospital from 
March 23, 1981, to March 28, 1981, and showed a marked dependency on drugs 
such as Darvon, Tylox, Percodan and Amitriptyline (an antidepressant). He 
requested high dosages of narcotic analgesics, but was taken off all 
narcotic analgesics. When the narcotic analgesics were withdrawn, Mr. 
Hardy became hostile and irritable but later expressed gratitude for being 
helped to rid himself of his dependency on such drugs. (Stipulated Facts, 
paragraph 20; R.839.) 
21. After his discharge from Mountain View Hospital in late March 
1981, Mr. Hardy reverted to his old pattern of drug misuse and abuse. 
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(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 21; R. 839-840•) 
22. On April 14, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an overdose of Darvon and 
Methadone (a synthetic narcotic analgesic). The overdose caused his body 
to go into respiratory arrest. When his wife, Terri, observed Mr. Hardy in 
respiratory arrest she tried to wake him up and when he didn't respond she 
called an ambulance. He was taken by ambulance to Sanpete Valley Hospital 
and admitted in a comatose state. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 22; R.840.) 
23. On the morning of April 15, 1981, medical personnel at Sanpete 
Valley Hospital offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug rehabilitation 
center but Mr. Hardy refused and indicated he preferred to stay in the 
hospital. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 23; R. 840e) 
24. On the morning of April 17, 1981, medical personnel at the 
Sanpete Valley Hospital again offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug 
rehabilitation center. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 24; R. 840.) 
25. On April 17, 1981, Mr. Hardy left Sanpete Valley Hospital 
without a discharge order but soon telephoned back for help. He expressed 
willingness to go to a drug rehabilitation center and arrangements were 
made through the Manti Mental Health Center to transfer him to the Drug 
Rehabilitation Program in the Psychiatric Department of Utah Valley 
Hospital. Mr. Hard/ voluntarily admitted himself to that program on April 
17, 1981, for treatment of drug abuse. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 25; R. 
840.) 
26. While in Utah Valley Hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 
27, 1981, Mr. Hardy admitted to various physicians and other medical 
personnel that he was addicted to Valium and Percodan, that he had used 12 
Valium tablets a day, that he had gone to many doctors to get drugs, that 
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he had used approximately 15-20 Percodan tablets a day, and that when 
Percodan was not available he vised Tylox if Tylox was available. 
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 26; R. 840-841.) 
27. While in the hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 27, 1981, 
the amounts of narcotic analgesics supplied to Mr. Hardy were gradually 
reduced until discontinued entirely. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 27? R. 
841.) 
28. In the course of Mr. Hardy's treatment at the Utah Valley 
Hospital in April 1981, Dr. Robert Crist advised Mr. Hardy that "his 
continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and 
that he would be living on borrowed time." Dr. Crist advised him that 
"those who abuse and misuse drugs, in the manner which he had done, live 
very short lives and that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse 
drugs to the degree that Bryce W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of 
thirty." Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of the advise given by Dr. 
Crist. Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of 
Robert Crist, M.D., (R. 1027-1029.) Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict 
such evidence. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 28; R. 841.) 
29. While in Utah Valley Hospital in April 1981, Mr. Hardy 
expressed to a nurse, Diane Sandstrcm Nance, his understanding that he 
needed to overcame his drug abuse problem, otherwise he would die as a 
result of his misuse and abuse of drugs. Diane Nance noted in the 
Inpatient Psychiatric Nurses Notes as follows: 
[Mr. Hardy] came to seme conclusions in group 
therapy. [He] decided to let his wife knew and 
help her to understand his reasons for being here. 
That even though she needs him at heme new, in the 
long run he needs to be here. He said he'd rather 
be here for awhile than be dead. 
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(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 29; R. 841.) 
30. On his release from Utah Valley Hospital on April 27, 1981
 f 
Mr. Hardy was referred to the Central Utah Mental Health Clinic for 
outpatient treatment of drug abuse. (Stipulated Facts, paragraph 30; R. 
841.) 
31. After his discharge from Utah Valley Hospital in late April 
1981, Mr. Hardy again reverted to drug abuse and misuse. (Stipulated 
Facts, paragraph 31; R. 842.) 
32. From May 21, 1981, to May 31, 1981, Mr. Hardy was again 
hospitalized in Utah Valley Hospital for treatment for drug abuse. 
(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 32; R. 842.) 
33. While in Utah Valley Hospital in late May 1981, Mr. Hardy was 
again counseled and admonished about his drug problem. (Stipulated Facts, 
paragraph 33; R. 842.) 
34. Bryce Hardy was a person of normal intelligence and was not 
suffering from any mental disease or defect during his life or at the time 
of his death which prohibited him from understanding the warnings which he 
had received relating to continued drug abuse and misuse or from 
understanding that the probable and expected consequence of continual 
misuse and abuse of drugs would be his untimely death. Mr. Hardy expressed 
an understanding of the counsel and warnings given to him by these health 
care professionals regarding the dangers of his continued drug abuse and 
misuse and there is no evidence that at the time of his death he was not 
able to comprehend the consequences of his acts. Defendant's evidence 
would also be as set forth in the Affidavit of Bryan S. Finkle, (R.1031-
1062.) Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. (Stipulated 
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Facts, paragraph 34; R. 842.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. In adjudicating this appeal, this Court is free to review the 
Stipulated Facts and to make its own conclusions of law. 
2. Under the principles set forth in Richards v. Standard Accident 
Insurance Co., 58 Utah 622, 200 P. 1017 (1921), Mr. Hardy's death was not 
an accident. Because Mr. Hardy recognized that the natural and probable 
consequence of his course of action in abusing drugs was his eventual 
death, and his death resulted from an abuse of drugs, Mr. Hardy intended or 
expected that his ingestion of drugs on the night of September 9, 1981, 
would cause his death on September 10, 1981. The trial court's Conclusion 
of Law to the contrary is in error. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This case was submitted by the parties to the District Court for 
trial on Stipulated F&cts. (R. 835-842) The District Court adopted the 
Stipulated Facts as its Findings of Fact and the facts are not in dispute. 
(R. 832) 
The issue before this Court is whether the Conclusion of Law reached 
by the court belcw is in error. 
In reviewing this matter, this Court is not bound by the trial 
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court's Conclusion of Law, nor is it obligated to give the trial court's 
conclusions any special deference. Western Kane County Special Service 
District No. 1 v. Jackson Cattle Company. 744 P. 2d 1376, 1377-78 (Utah 
1987). 
In adjudicating this appeal, this court is free to review the 
Stipulated Facts, and to make its own conclusions of law and to enter 
judgment based thereon. 
In view of the conceded facts, which cannot be 
disputed, and in view of the well-settled law, 
there is - there can be - but one conclusion in 
this case . . . . in view that the result entirely 
depends upon a legal question, this court should 
end the litigation between the parties and now 
declare the legal conclusion that the district 
court should have declared. 
Willis v. Kronendonk. 58 Utah 592, 605, 200 P. 1025, 1031 (1921). 
Beneficial is entitled to have this case adjudicated under correct 
principles of law0 
Where a trial court has based its ruling on a 
misunderstanding of the law, or might have done so, 
and a correct application would have produced a 
different result, the adversely affected party is 
entitled to have the matter adjudicated under 
correct principles of law. 
Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P.2d 410, 421-21 (Utah 
1983). 
II. THE DEAIH OF BRYCE W. HARDY WAS NOT ACCIDENTAL 
Hie insurance policy in issue provides in pertinent part as follows: 
Accidental Death: Ihe Company will pay 
the sum for which application was made by 
the Insured upon receipt of due proof 
that the insured's death resulted, 
directly and independently of all other 
causes, from accidental bodily injury... 
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(Stipulated Facts, paragraph 11; R. 837.) 
Ihis appeal presents this issue: Given the facts that (1) Bryce W. 
Hardy's death resulted from the misuse and abuse of drugs (Stipulated Facts 
1, 2, 9 and 10; R. 835-37) and (2) that he had a long history of drug 
misuse and abuse (Stipulated Facts 12-14, 16-22, 26, 31-32; R. 837-842), 
and (3) that he understood and appreciated that the natural, probable and 
expected consequences of his continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be 
his untimely death (Stipulated Facts 29 and 34, R. 841-42.); should his 
death be ruled accidental under the accidental death policy in question. 
In Richards v. Standard Accident Insurance CO.. 58 Utah 622, 635, 
200 P. 1017, 1022 (1921), the Utah Supreme Court defined the word 
"accident" or "accidental," as used in the context of accidental death 
insurance policies, as follows: 
The authorities generally hold that death 
...does not result from accident . . . 
within the terms of an accident insurance 
policy where the ... death is the natural 
and probable result of the insured's 
voluntary act imacccottpanied by anything 
unforeseen except the death . 
(emphasis added) 
In discussing the "authorities," the Richards Court quoted with 
approval frcm Western Commercial Travelers7 Association v. Smith, 85 F. 
401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898): 
The significance of this word "accidental" is best 
perceived by a consideration of the relation of 
causes to their effects. The word is descriptive 
of means which produce effects which are not their 
natural and probable consequences. . . . An effect 
which is the natural and probable consequence of an 
act or course of action is not an accident . . . It 
is either the result of actual design, or it falls 
under the maxim that every man must be held to 
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intend the natural and probable consequences of his 
deeds, (emphasis added) 
58 Utah at 636, 200 P. at 1023. 
The Richards Court also quoted from Lickleider v. Traveling Men^s 
Association, 184 Iowa 423, 166 N.W. 363, 366 (Iowa 1918): 
It may be, and it is, true that, if the insured 
does a voluntary act, the natural, usual, and to be 
expected result of which is to bring injury upon 
himself, then a death so occurring is not an 
accident. To illustrate: A. may be foolhardy 
enough to believe that he can leap from a fourth-
story window with safety, and, trying it, is 
killed. B., desiring to descend from the same 
floor, climbs out upon a fire escape, which 
collapses, and he falls to his death. In no proper 
sense of the word is A.'s death accidental . . . 
nor can any reasonable person deny that B. 's death 
is accidental, (emphasis added) 
58 Utah at 636, 200 P. at 1023. 
The Richards case defined the phrase "natural and probable 
consequence" as follows: 
The natural consequence... [is] the consequence which 
ordinarily follows . . . the result which may be reasonably 
anticipated . . . and which ought to be expected. The 
probable consequence . . . is the consequence which is more 
likely to follow . . . than it is to fail to follow, 
(emphasis added.) 
58 Utah at 636, 200 P. at 1023. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently applied the principles set 
forth in the Richards case to various factual situations. See Carter v. 
Standard Accident Insurance Co.. 65 Utah 465, 238 P. 259, 274-275 (1925); 
Billincrs v. Continental Life Insurance Co.. 81 Utah 572, 577-78, 21 P. 2d 
103, 106 (1933); Whatcott v. Continental Casualty Co., 85 Utah 406, 39 P. 
2d 733, 736 (1935); Sanders v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.. 104 Utah 
75, 83, 138 P. 2d 239, 242-43 (1943); Handley v. Mutual Life Insurance CO., 
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106 Utah 184, 192, 147 P. 2d 319, 322-323 (1944); Kellogg v. California 
Western States Life Insurance Oo.. 114 Utah 567, 201 P. 2d 949 (1949); 
Thompson v. American Casualty Co., 20 Utah 2d 418, 439 P. 2d 276 (1968). 
The most recent Utah Supreme Court case involving accidental death 
is Hoffman v. Life Insurance Co. of North America, 669 P. 2d 410 (Utah 
1983), which also applied the Richards principles. In Hoffman, the Supreme 
Court explained that the determination of whether death is the natural and 
probable result of a person's act or course of action is to be made from 
the point of view of that person. 
Thus, a person is the victim of an accident vftien, 
from the victim's point of view . . . the injury or 
death is not a natural and probable result of the 
victim's own acts. 
Id. at 416. 
An examination of the facts in this case, in light of the Richards 
and Hoffman cases, is in order. Ihis examination involves two steps. 
First, determine the cause of death, and second, determine whether death 
from that cause, frcm the viewpoint of the decedent, was the natural and 
probable result of the decedent's act or course of action. 
Ihe parties in this case have stipulated as to the cause of Mr. 
Hardy's death. He died on September 10, 1981, from the misuse and abuse of 
prescription drugs resulting in narcotic intoxication. (Stipulated Facts 
1, 2, 9, 10, R-835-37.) Ihe sole remaining issue is whether Mr. Hardy's 
death from this cause was expected or anticipated by him. 
Ihe tried court concluded that death was accidental because the 
Stipulated Facts did not "demonstrate that Mr. Hardy either intended or 
expected that his consumption of drugs would cause his death on September 
10, 1981." Uiis conclusion is erroneous. 
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A, Mr. Hardy expected to die on September 10, 1981 
from his misuse and abuse of drugs. 
As fully set forth in the Stipulated Facts, Mr. Hardy had been 
misusing and abusing drugs for many years prior to his deatho The record 
discloses the he was using drugs in November of 1973, and within a year he 
was abusing and misusing those drugs. (Stipulated Fact 13; R. 837-38.) This 
misuse and abuse continued unabated from 1974 until his death in 1981. 
(Stipulated Facts 12-14, 16-22, 26, 31-32; R. 837-842.) In 1977 he was 
admitted to a hospital in a comatose condition, having attempted suicide by 
taking an overdose of Valium tablets and alcohol. In April of 1981 he was 
again hospitalized in a comatose state, again as result of the misuse and 
abuse of drugs. Throughout a period covering eight years he was repeatedly 
warned by his physicians and others that if he did not stop abusing and 
misusing prescription drugs he would "end up killing himself." (Stipulated 
Fact 18; R. 838-839.) Mr. Hardy himself recognized that if he continued in 
his course of action of abusing and misusing drugs he would end up "dead". 
(Stipulated Fact 29; R. 841.) 
In Richards, the Supreme Court stated that death is not accidental 
if it is the "natural and probable result of the insured's voluntary act 
unaccompanied by anything unforeseen except the death". 58 Utah at 635, 
200 P. at 1022. As the Stipulated Facts reveal, Mr. Hardy understood "that 
the probable and esqpected consequence of his continued misuse and abuse of 
drugs would be his untimely death". 
[T]he common meaning of the term [accident] is 
defined in terms of whether the event was naturally 
and probably expected or anticipated by the 
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insured. 
• • • • 
[Wjhere the insured expected or anticipated that 
death would follow from his or her conduct recovery 
has been denied. 
• • • • 
Thus, if the insured actually knows that his or her 
death is more likely than not to occur, the death 
is not accidental, (emphasis added) 
Hoffman, 669 P. 2d at 416, 417, 419. 
Mr. Hardy's death, on September 10, 1981, from the misuse and abuse 
of drugs was expected by him and, by definition, cannot be deemed 
accidental. The trial court's Conclusion of Law to the contrary is clearly 
erroneous. Applying the principles of Richards and Hoffman to the 
Stipulated Facts of this case: "an effect [death from the misuse and abuse 
of drugs] which is the natural and probable consequence of an act or course 
of action [continued drug abuse and misuse over an eight year period of 
time] is not an accident". 
B. Mr. Hardy intended to die on September 10, 1981, 
frcm his misuse and abuse of drugs. 
The Stipulated Facts referred to in II. A., above, also demonstrate 
that Mr. Hardy intended that his consumption of drugs would cause his death 
on September 10, 1981. In the Richards case the Supreme Court stated that 
an effect "vdiich is the natural and probable consequence of an act or 
course of action is not an accident . . . It is either the result of actual 
design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be held to intend 
the natural and probable consequences of his deeds.» 58 Utah at 636, 200 
P. at 1023. (Emphasis added) 
Mr. Hardy understood that death would be the natural and probable 
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consequence of continued drug abuse and misuse. (Stipulated Fact 29, 34? R. 
841-42.) Mr. Hardy did, on the occasion of his death, misuse and abuse 
drugs. By virtue of the maxim stated above, he must be held to have 
intended the natural and probable consequences of his deeds and therefore 
the facts establish not only that he ejected, but that he intended that 
his consumption of drugs would result in his death on September 10, 1981. 
C. In relating a cause to its effect, the court 
must consider the entire course of action not 
merely a single act. 
It may be that court below rested its Conclusion of Law upon the 
premise that, in determining whether death was intended or expected, the 
court can look only to the events immediately preceding the event of death, 
that is, examine only the events of the night of September 9, 1981, and the 
morning of September 10, 1981. Indeed, a review of the Minute Entry made 
by the Court on February 9, 1988, discloses that the trial court may well 
have rested its conclusion on such premise. (R.826-29.) Such a conclusion 
would be erroneous. 
In Kellogg v. California Western States Life Insurance Co., 114 Utah 
567, 201 P. 2d 949 (1949), the Supreme Court sustained a decision by the 
trial court that death was non-accidental under the following facts. Hie 
deceased insured died from post-operative shock. A year prior to his 
death, the insured had suffered severe post-operative shock following 
surgery. Hie deceased, despite his post-operative shock experience from 
the first surgery, decided to undergo the second operation. He suffered 
post-operative shock and died. The Supreme Court, in reviewing this matter 
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did not confine its analysis of whether the deceased expected or intended 
to die as a result of the second surgery merely to the events immediately 
preceding the second surgery. It found it appropriate, necessary and 
logical to include in its analysis the earlier operation and post operative 
shock in order to determine What the deceased would reasonably anticipate 
or expect as a result of undergoing the second operation. 
[T]he evidence shows that the deceased suffered shock after 
the first operation, which was a less complicated operation. 
In the second operation it was discovered deceased's 
condition was such that the operation was going to be long 
and hard .... If the first or lesser operation was productive 
of shock, it is very likely that the second or greater 
operation will magnify that shock accordingly. 
[T]he question of accident lies in the question of the 
anticipatory nature of the results, which in turn should be 
measured by the susceptibility of the deceased to such 
results . . . Specifically applied here: Deceased's previous 
experience with shock from a lesser operation coupled with 
his physical condition, including that disclosed upon the 
initiation of the second operation, viewed in the light of 
the nature and the length [of the second operation] are all 
facts which support the belief that death was not accidental. 
Fost-qperative shock to a dangerous degree was very likely to 
him. He was a poor risk, as one doctor indicated. His 
history made a bad prognosis, said the other. 
These principles we have discussed are illustrated in 
the case of Cooper v. New York Life Insurance Co., 1947, 198 
Okl. 611, 180 P. 2d 654. In that case a patient died from 
poisoning, the result of the injection of morphine sulphate, 
a recognized method of treatment. The case discloses no 
history of any abnormality in the deceased. The result was 
extraordinary and unanticipated. It was held accidental. 
Suppose, however, evidence has been produced that previously 
in the course of an operation deceased had reacted violently 
to such an injection, although he did not pass away. Would 
that make a difference in solving the question of accident? 
Certainly the rule of unexpectedness must be governed by the 
facts evidencing a susceptibility of the victim to the 
attendant results. Each individual may be considered the 
average individual unless the facts disclose that in reality 
he is not; and **ien the facts do so show, then the question 
of the accidental nature of the result must be measured by 
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this knowledge, [citation omitted] If the deceased is in a 
physical condition vfaich has reduced his resistance, it 
stands to reason that he is not going to withstand an 
operation as well as the normal man. If, in addition to the 
strain he is susceptible to shock, it seems almost conclusive 
that serious results may be likely. Tto speak of his death as 
accidental under such circumstances is to say that such death 
is always accidental, as there would be no measure for 
dividing it into two classes of accidental and non-
accidental, (emphasis added) 
Id. at 571-74, 201 P. 2d at 952-53. 
In this case, the trial court apparently looked merely to the events 
occurring on the night of September 9, 1981, and the morning of September 
10, 1981. Ihe court failed to consider Mr. Hardy's long history of misuse 
and abuse of drugs and Mr. Hardy's knowledge of what would inevitably occur 
from continued misuse of drugs. Mr* Hardy's death cannot be viewed in a 
vacuum. What was to be reasonably anticipated and expected must be viewed 
"by the fact evidencing a susceptibility of the victim to the attendant 
results." It must be viewed in the light of Mr. Hardy's history of misuse 
and abuse of drugs and measured by the fact that Mr. Hardy expected that he 
would die from exactly what caused his death, a drug overdose as the result 
of drug misuse and abuse. When viewed in this light there can be no 
conclusion other than that the deceased died on September 10, 1981, as he 
anticipated and expected that he would. 
"Each individual may be considered the average 
individual unless the facts disclose that in 
reality he is not; and when the facts do so show, 
then the question of the accidental nature of the 
result must be measured by this knowledge." 
Kellogg v. California Western States Life Insurance 
Oo., supra, 114 Utah at 574, 201 P. 2d at 952. 
Since the reason for this rule is that the 
subjective state of mind of the insured cannot 
generally be known, the law presumes that the 
insured is a "reasonable person" or "average 
individual" and applies an objective test unless 
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the evidence shews that the insured is not an 
"average iixiividual." Therefore, when the actual 
state of mind of the insured can be established, 
the probability of death resulting frcm certain 
conduct should be judged in light of that state of 
mind. 
Hoffman, 669 P. 2d at 419. 
The facts in this case disclose that Mr. Hardy was not an "average 
individual", as far as drugs were concerned, on the evening prior to his 
death. The average individual is not a drug addict who has used and abused 
drugs over many years, **io has been hospitalized on several occasions, two 
of \diich were in a conatose condition as a result of drug overdoses, and 
who had received professional counseling assuring him that his continued 
abuse of drugs would result in his death. Given that background, no 
reasonable mind can conclude that his death was the result of an accident. 
The trial court rested its decision on the conclusion that the evidence was 
insufficient to prove that Mr. Hardy intended or expected to die on 
September 10, 1981, from his misuse of drugs. As supported by the 
principles recited in the case authorities, the trial court should have 
asked the question, "Did he intend or expect to die from the misuse or 
abuse of drugs?" If so, and if he died from the abuse of drugs, the death 
was not an accident. 
While, as set forth above, Mr. Hardy was not an "average individual" 
so far as drug use was concerned, he "was a person of normal intelligence 
and was not suffering from any mental disease or defect." (Stipulated Fact 
34; R. 842.) 
The reason men secure accident insurance is to 
protect them from the unforeseen, unusual, and 
unexpected injury that mi^ tit happen to them while 
pursuing the usual and ordinary routine of their 
daily vocation, or the doing of the things that men 
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do in the common everyday affairs of life* We are 
of opinion that the better reasoning points out, 
and the weight of authority holds the true test to 
be, that if in the act which precedes the injury, 
though an intentional act, something unusual, 
unforeseen, and unexpected occurs, which produces 
the injury, it is accidental; but, if in the act 
which precedes the injury something usual, 
foreseen, and expected occurs, which produces the 
injury* it is not accidentally effected. (emphasis 
added) 
Richards, 58 Utah at 634, 200 P. at 1022. 
Mr. Hardy's death from drug abuse cannot be viewed as being 
unforseen by him, nor unusual, nor unexpected, nor can it be perceived as 
having- occurred while he was pursuing the usual and ordinary routine of his 
daily vocation or in the common everyday affairs of his life. It was 
foreseen by him, expected by him and occurred as the result of his 
voluntary act in an activity which was known to hiia to be dangerous and 
deadly. 
OONOUSiaN 
Mr. Hardy's history of drug abuse presents the case of a man playing 
Russian roulette. He knew he was playing a very dangerous game. On two 
earlier- occasions, he had, in effect, "shot himself in the head" but 
emergency medical attention had saved his life. He had been repeatedly 
warned that playing the game would eventually result in his death. Mr« 
Hardy had also been playing the game for a long time. He knew that the 
longer he played, the greater his certainty of dying became. He had already 
pulled the trigger several times. In September, 1981, he finally pulled 
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the trigger on the chamber containing the fatal bullet. 
The natural and probable consequence of Mr. Hardy's continued 
playing of the game of drug abuse was death. His death was not an 
accident. 
Ihe judgment of the trial court should be reversed and judgment in 
favor of the Defendant-Appellant should be entered, denying recovery on the 
insurance policy in question because Mr. Hardy's death was not the result 
of accidental bodily injury* 
Dated this 16th day of September, 1988. 
PCMNEY & OONDIE 
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29 
Dated this /&& ^
 Qf Sepbeaterf 1 9 8 8 > 
ADDENDUM TO 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
A-l STIHJIATED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A-2 MINUTE ENTRY 
A-3 FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF IAW 
AND JUDQ4ENT 
A-1 
STirUIATED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
fU-MEP 
1 
2! 
3| 
4 
51 
61 
7 
81 
9 
101 
11 
121 
13 
14 
151 
16 
17 
18 
19 
201 
21 
221 
23 
241 
25 
26 
27 
281 
George J. Romney (2789) 
David J. Holdsworth (4052) 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
Attorneys for Defendant 
700 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 E. South Temple 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 321-7800 
^o^tifi^ici^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, widow of 
BRYCE W. HARDY, deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
STIPULATED STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Civil No. C-83-6569 
Honorable Scott Daniels 
Defendant. 
The Plaintiff, by and through her counsel of record M. David 
Eckersley, and the Defendant, by and through its counsel of record George 
J. Romney, stipulate as follows: 
1. Bryce Hardy died on September 10, 1981, as a result of a 
narcotic intoxication resulting from ingestion of drugs which may lawfully 
be obtained only by prescription. 
2. The Utah State Medical Examiner's report listed the cause of 
death as a "combined codeine, propoxyphene and trimothobenzamide 
intoxication'" and the Medical Examiner described the manner of death as 
"Undetermined'1', as distinguished from "Accident", "Suicide", "Homicide" and 
"Natural causes". A copy of the Autopsy Report and Toxicology Report are 
attached as Exhibit "A". The Certificate of Death listed the cause of 
death as "Combined codeine, propoxyphene & trimothobenzamide intoxication" 
I occurring frem the "Ingestion of drugs" and described the manner of death 
9 as "Undetermined if injured Accidentally or Purposely" as distinguished 
o from "Accident", "Suicide", "Hcmicide" and "Pending Investigation". A copy 
J ii of the Death Certificate is attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
P-11 3. Following Mr. Hardy's death the Plaintiff, Terri C* Hardy, and 
n\\ her friend Julie Shepherd gave written statements to the police describing 
the events preceding and immediately following Mr. Hardy's death. Copies 
of these statements are attached as Exhibits "C", "D", and "E". 
4. The Mt. Pleasant City Police Department prepared an Incident 
Report describing events on the morning of Mr. Hardy's death. A copy of 
said report is attached as Exhibit "F". 
5. Plaintiff's evidence would shew that on the evening preceding 
his death, Mr. Hardy did not appear anxious or depressed and he made no 
statements, oral or written, reflecting any intention to take his own life* 
His activities, as observed by his wife, Terri Hardy, were routine and 
included making preparations for the next day's work at his job, reading to 
his children and watching television. Defendant has no evidence to 
contradict such evidence. 
6. On the night of September 9, 1981, or the morning of September 
10, 1981, Mr. Hardy took an undetermined amount of drugs containing 
codeine*, propoxyphene (Darvon) and trimethobenzamide (Tigan). 
7. Codeine is a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Propoxyphene 
is also a centrally acting narcotic analgesic. Trimethobenzamide is an 
anti emetic agent. 
8. The quantity of drugs ingested by Mr. Hardy prior to his death 
is not able to be determined from the autopsy, toxicological analysis or 
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I any other existing data. 
n 9. There is no evidence of Bryoe Hardy having obtained by 
o prescription the drugs which he ingested on the occasion of his death. 
A\ 10. Defendant's evidence would shew that the ingested drugs were 
. self administered and were not prescribed by a physician for medical 
purposes and constituted an abuse and misuse of prescription drugs. 
-II Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. The ingested drugs 
R were taken despite treatment which Mr. Hardy had received for withdrawal 
from his addiction to such drugs and in contravention of the warnings and 
counseling which he had received to stop taking such drugs. 
11. At the time of his death Mr. Hardy was insured by Beneficial 
Life Insurance Company under the terms of two group policies. One 
providing benefits of $25,000.00 in the event of death regardless of cause 
and the other providing a benefit of $25,000.00 only in case of accidental 
death. Plaintiff Terri Hardy is the named beneficiary of both policies. 
The benefits under the first policy were paid and this action relates to 
the accidental death policy which provides in pertinent part as follcws: 
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Accidental Death: The Company will pay the sum for 
181] which application was made by the Insured upon 
receipt of due proof that the insured's death 
1911 resulted, directly and independently of all other 
M causes, from accidental bodily injury. . . . 
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12. Prior to Bryce Hardy's death, he had been diagnosed as 
suffering from and had received treatment for drug dependency and abuse. 
Attached hereto as Exhibit "Q" are copies of medical reports and 
prescription records relating thereto. 
13. Mr. Hardy began using Darvon (a trade name for propoxyphene) by 
November, 1973. By November 1974, Mr. Hardy was abusing Darvon. During 
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1 the years 1974, 1975, and 1976, Mr. Hardy was repeatedly counseled and 
2 warned by his physician that he was using excessive amounts of Darvon. 
o 14. In March 1977, Mr. Hardy attempted to ccarardt suicide by taking 
J an overdose of Valium (a centrally acting tranquilizing depressant) tablets 
. and alcohol and was transported by ambulance to a hospital in a comatose 
state. Djring this time period Mr. Hardy was very despondent about the 
failure of his first marriage. 
jJI 15. In 1979, vftiile employed as a miner with Emery Mining Company, 
Mr. Hardy was involved in an accident which injured his back. He received 
prescriptions for drugs for treatment of his back pain. At other times, 
Mr. Harc3y also received prescriptions for drugs for treatment of internal 
disorders associated with a diseased pancreas. 
16. By late 1979, Mr. Hardy was dependent on, and misusing and 
abusing narcotic drugs including codeine, Tylenol 3 (a combination of 
acetominophen and codeine), Darvon (propoxyphene), Tylox (a trade name for 
oxycodone, a semi synthetic narcotic analgesic), Percodan (also a trade 
name for oxycodone) and Valium. 
17. During 1980, and 1981, Mr. Hart3y manipulated several doctors to 
obtain prescriptions for narcotic drugs. As a result of these 
manipulations he was able to obtain large quantities of prescription drugs 
which he abused and misused. 
18. In March, 1981, Don C. lankford, a Clinical Social Wbrker and 
Certified Social Worker, met on three occasions with Mr. Hardy at the 
request of Dr. Jackson who was considering performing back surgery on Mr* 
Hardy. At the first meeting, Mr. lankford administered a test known as the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI). In their second 
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« meeting Mr. Lankford discussed the results of the MMPI test. At that time 
n Mr. Hardy stated that he had a history of drug abuse and that he was 
o continuing to abuse and misuse drugs. He further stated that he had 
4 previously attempted suicide and that if he got a chance, he would kill 
himself and that he wanted to die. Mr. Lankford told Mr. Hardy "that if he 
did not step abusing and misusing drugs, he would end up killing himself." 
Mr. lankford further advised Mr. Hardy to seek help at the St. Benedict's 
Hospital or at his local mental health center for his serious drug 
problems. After his meetings with Mr. Hardy, Mr. lankford advised Dr. 
Jackson against performing surgery on Mr. Hardy and that surgery was never 
performed. At the time Mr. Lankford met with Mr. Hardy, Mr. Lankford was 
of the opinion that Mr. Hardy understood the counsel which he had given him 
and the consequences of his continued misuse and abuse of drugs. 
Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of Don 
Lankford, attached hereto as Exhibit "H". Plaintiff has no evidence to 
contradict such evidence. 
19. On three occasions in the spring of 1981, Mr. Hardy was 
hospitalized for treatment of prescription drug dependency* 
20. Mr. Hardy was hospitalized in Mountain View Hospital from March 
23, 1981, to March 28, 1981, and shewed a marked dependency on drugs such 
as Darvon, Tylox, Peroodan and Amitriptyline (an antidepressant). He 
requested high dosages of narcotic analgesics, but was taken off all 
narcotic analgesics. When the narcotic analgesics were withdrawn Mr. Hardy 
became hostile and irritable but later expressed gratitude for being helped 
to rid himself of his dependency on such drugs. 
21. After his discharge fron Mountain View Hospital in late March 
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j 1981, Mr. Hardy reverted to his old pattern of drug misuse and abuse. 
9 22. On April 14, 1981# Mr. Hardy took an overdose of Darvon and 
o Methadone (a synthetic narcotic analgesic). The overdose caused his body 
J to go into respiratory arrest. When his wife, Terri, observed Mr. Hardy in 
pj respiratory arrest she tried to wake him up and when he didn't respond she 
/J called an ambulance. He was taken by ambulance to Sanpete Valley Hospital 
«. i and admitted in a comatose state, 
g I 23. On the morning of April 15, 1981, medical personnel at Sanpete 
Valley Hospital offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug rehabilitation 
center but Mr. Hardy refused and indicated he preferred to stay in the 
hospital. 
24. On the morning of April 17, 1981, medical personnel at the 
Sanpete Valley Hospital again offered to transfer Mr. Hardy to a drug 
rehabilitation center. 
25. On April 17, 1981, Mr. Hardy left Sanpete Valley Hospital 
without a discharge order but soon telephoned back for help. He expressed 
willingness to go to a drug rehabilitation center and arrangements were 
made through the Manti Mental Health Center to transfer him to the Drug 
Rehabilitation Program in the Psychiatric Department of Utah Valley 
Hospital. Mr. Hardy voluntarily admitted himself to that program on April 
17, 1981, for treatment of drug abuse. 
26. While in Utah Valley Hospital frcci April 17, 1981, to April 27, 
1981, Mr. Hardy admitted to various physicians and other medical personnel 
that he was addicted to Valium and Percodan, that he had used 12 Valium 
tablets a day, that he had gone to many doctors to get drugs, that he had 
used approximately 15-20 Percodan tablets a day, and that when Percodan was 
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j not available he used Tylox if Tylox was available. 
2 27. While in the hospital from April 17, 1981, to April 27, 1981, 
r, the amounts of narcotic analgesics supplied to Mr. Hardy were gradually 
4 reduced until discontinued entirely. 
p. 28. In the course of Mr. Hardy's treatment at the Utah Valley 
Hospital in April 1981, Dr. Robert Crist advised Mr. Hardy that "his 
continued misuse and abuse of drugs would be a life-shortening process and 
that he would be living on borrowed time." Dr. Crist advised him that 
"those who abuse and misuse drugs, in the manner which he had done, live 
very short lives and that few of those who continue to abuse and misuse 
drugs to the degree that Bryce W. Hardy had done lived beyond the age of 
thirty." Mr. Hardy voiced his understanding of the advice given by Dr. 
Crist. Defendant's evidence would be as set forth in the Affidavit of 
Robert Crist, M.D., attached hereto as Exhibit "I". Plaintiff has no 
evidence to contradict such evidence. 
29. While in Utah Valley Hospital in April 1981, Mr. Hardy 
expressed to a nurse, Diane Sandstrcm Nance, his understanding that he 
needed to overcome his drug abuse problem, otherwise he would die as a 
result of his misuse and abuse of drugs. Diane Nance noted in the 
Inpatient Psychiatric Nurses Notes as follcws: 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20,, 
[Mr. Hardy] came to some conclusions in group 
21II therapy. [He] decided to let his wife knew and 
help her to understand his reasons for being here. 
2 2 J | That even though she needs him at heme new, in the 
long run he needs to be here. He said he'd rather 
2311 be here for awhile than be dead. 
24 30. On his release from Utah Valley Hospital on April 27, 1981, Mr. 
25 Hardy was referred to the Central Utah Mental Health Clinic for outpatient 
26 treatment of drug abuse. 
27 7 
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1 31. After his discharge front Utah Valley Hospital in late April 
2 1981, Mr. Hardy again reverted to drug abuse and misuse. 
o 32. From May 21, 1981, to May 31, 1981, Mr. Hardy was again 
4 hospitalized in Utah Valley Hospital for treatment for drug abuse. 
I- 33. While in Utah Valley Hospital in late May 1981, Mr. Hardy was 
fi again counseled and admonished about his drug problem. 
- 34. Hardy was a person of normal intelligence and was not suffering 
from any mental disease or defect during his life or at the time of his 
death which prohibited him from understanding the warnings which he had 
received relating to continued drug abuse and misuse or from understanding 
that the probable and expected consequence of continued misuse and abuse of 
drugs would be his untimely death. Mr. Hardy expressed an understanding of 
the counsel and warnings given to him by these health care professionals 
regarding the dangers of his continued drug abuse and misuse and there is 
no evidence that at the time of his death he was not able to ccnprehend the 
consecjuences of his acts. Defendant's evidence would also be as set forth 
in the Affidavit of Bryan S. Finkle, attached hereto as Exhibit "3". 
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Plaintiff has no evidence to contradict such evidence. 
DATED this ~~ day of January, 1988. 
HOUPT & ECKERSIEY 
M. David E c k e r s l e y ^ > 2311 . avi Ecfcersley 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
24[" 
25 
26 
27 I 8 
281 
00CS42 
1 
21 
31 
4 
51 
6! 
7 
81 
91 
101 
11 
121 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18] 
19 
201 
21 
221 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
281 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
George JSBfxarJef \ 
Atxorney fcovDefendant 
OGCS&.5 
A-2 
MINUTE ENTRY 
FiUED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake County Utah 
FEB 10 7g 
H. Wxcn H:nci£y, Clerk 3rc Dist Court 
ey K 7 ' " ^ r i y . -, 
j Deruty Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT CCURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT IAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, ET AL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE CO., 
Defendant. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NO. C-83-6569 
The Court having heard argument, having considered the memorandum and 
the points and authorities filed by each party herein, and having read the 
authorities cited to the Court rules herein as follows. The Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgement is denied. Ihe Court having read the 
authorities is of the opinion that the actions of the decedant in taking 
drugs, vfriich ultimately caused his death, was not intended by the victim at 
the time that the drugs were taken to cause his death. The Court is of the 
opinion that Hoffman v. Life Insurance Conparry of North America, 669 P. 2d 
410 (Utah, 1983) and the standards set forth in Richards v. Standard 
Accident Insurance Company 58 Utah 662, 200 P. 1017 (1921) govern herein. 
It was in Richards that our Supreme Court first established the standard for 
defining the words "accident" or "accidental." It was there said, "the word 
is descriptive of means vfriich produce effects which are not their natural 
nnr«42b 
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arid probable consequences...." It was further said there, "It is either the 
result of actual design, or it falls under the maxim that every man must be 
held to intend the natural and probable consequences of his deeds.11 Hoffman 
then goes on to cite numerous cases in which the Richard's Standard had been 
applied consistently by the Supreme Ocurt of Utah. 
The argument between the parties here relates to, in effect, a time 
continuum. It would be the argument of the defense that Mr. Hardy's taking 
of drugs knowing that continued drug usage over a period of time would 
shorten his life, perhaps to the point where he would die before the age of 
30 (which he in fact did), or that he could die at probably any time after 
ingesting drugs would not meet the definition of accident in Hoffman and 
Richards. However, the problem is that under the Hoffman definition, his 
taking of the drugs either must be the intended result or one which was 
".. .the natural and probable consequences of his deeds." There is no 
evidence of intention in this case. As a matter of fact, the presumption is 
against an attempted suicide and, thus, the latter phrase must be looked to. 
While the Court could believe under some circumstances that a person 
intended to die by taking excessive drugs given, the facts of this case 
relating to Mr. Hardy's prior attempts at rehabilitation, his work pattern 
the day before his death, and the activities carried on the evening before 
his death, it is difficult for this Court to find as a matter of law that 
the victim (through whose eyes we must see in order to determine the intent) 
intended to die by taking drugs as he did. This is particularly true given 
*••». #^ / •» tf"^, f~z t*4 
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the general attitude of most humans vfrio undertake something risky. It is 
for the thrill of the risk and surviving it that the act is undertaken. It 
is seldom intended, although it might be anticipated, that injury or death 
might arise. 
The Plaintiff's attorney will prepare the order denying Summary 
Judgement. 
Dated this f t^ day of February, 1988. 
Richard H/ Mbf 
D i s t r i c t /Court! tfudge 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON HINDLEY 
CLERK 
Deputy b'erk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that a true and correct, postage prepaid copy of the 
foregoing Minute Entry was mailed to: 
George Romney, Esq. 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tcwer 
60 East South Temple 
Salt late City, OT 84111 
David J. Holdsworth 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Virginius Dabney, Esq. 
Kearns Building - Suite 412 
136 South Main Street 
Salt late City, UT 84101 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Late City, UT 84111 
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FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF IAW AND JUDGMENT 
FILtJ ',. c '" 
M. David Eckersley (0956) 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-0453 
Sell 
H Daon 
By 
'ICE 
MAY 9 1S33 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TERRI C. HARDY, et al., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BENEFICIAL LIFE INSURANCE 
CO. , 
Defendant. 
&kc£/3 AJo- 990 b 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No: C-83-6569 
This matter was submitted to the Court upon stipulated 
facts. Trial was held on January 27, 1988, with plaintiff being 
represented by David Eckersley and defendant by George J. 
Romney. The Court, having reviewed the stipulation and attached 
exhibits, and having considered the arguments and memoranda 
of counsel hereby enters the following order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Court finds the facts to be those set forth in 
the stipulation executed by the parties and filed with the Court 
on January 27, 1988. 
OOCS2'-11 
CONCLUSION OF LAW 
As the stipulated facts do not demonstrate that 
Mr. Bryce Hardy either intended or expected that his consumption 
of drugs would cause his death on September 10, 1981, the Court 
concludes that Mr. Hardy's death was the result of accidental 
bodily injury within the meaning of the insurance policy in 
question. 
JUDGMENT 
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of plaintiff 
Terri C. Hardy and against defendant Beneficial Life Insurance 
Company in the amount of $25,000.00, together with prejudgment 
interest at the rate of 107o per annum from November 10, 1981 
until the date of this Judgment. 
DATED this V day of May, 1988. 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COUR' 
By 
ATTEST 
H. DlXui. hsNDLEY 
CLXRK 
puiy oierK 
- 2 - nnn &**<-> 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing was mailed this I^L day of April, 1988, to the 
following: 
George J. Romney 
ROMNEY & CONDIE 
60 East South Temple 
700-38 Eagle Gate Tower 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HOUPT & ECKERSLEY^ 
